International Bureaucracies:

The Contours of a (Re)Emerging Research Agenda

Thorsten Benner

Stephan Mergenthaler

Philipp Rotmann

Paper presented at the German Political Science Association (DVPW) IR section conference

Darmstadt

14 July 2007

DRAFT

Please do not cite without permission of the authors. Comments are most welcome!

Corresponding author:

Thorsten Benner

Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Reinhardtstr. 15

D-10117 Berlin

Email: tbenner@gppi.net

www.gppi.net

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). Thanks also go to Mitja Müller, Oliver Sanderson, Joshua Tartakovsky and Jan Martin Witte for valuable comments on the draft.

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION

International bureaucracies are crucial engines for international cooperation and global governance. These bureaucracies have grown both in their number and size over the past several decades. In recent years, they have increasingly come under attack for their inefficiencies, mismanagement, and lack of accountability. Yet at the same time we know very little about the actual workings of these bureaucracies. The popular media does not provide a very detailed or nuanced perspective on the work of international bureaucracies. Research of the past decades has for the most part ignored international bureaucracies. This applies to almost all of the major disciplines which could possibly shed some light on international secretariats: law, economics, history, social anthropology, social psychology, sociology, public administration and political science. It is striking that the most informative recent research on bureaucracies as the World Bank and the UN Secretariat to have come out in book-length was written by journalists.[1]

[1] Sebastian Mallaby's *The World's Banker* (2004) and James Traub's *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power* (2006).

In this collective academic silence, perhaps the greatest disappointment is the fact that a solid contribution did not emerge from the discipline of International Relations (IR). International bureaucracies should be a core concern for IR researchers – at least for those who pride themselves for being "institutionalists", be they of the rationalist or the constructivist school or of yet another variety. However, IR research by and large abandoned the study of formal international organizations in the early 1970s. During the heydays of research on "international regimes" in the 1980s and early 1990s, international organizations were greeted by academics with a "great yawn" (Susan Strange, quoted in Barnett and Finnemore 2004: IV). This indifference was driven partly by what was deemed the "apparent irrelevance of formal organizations" during the cold war (Martin and Simmons 2002: 193).2 As Kratochwil and Ruggie pointed out in their 1986 review of key research trends, "students of international organization have shifted their focus systematically away from international institutions, toward broader forms of international institutionalized behaviour" (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 753-754). This trend continued in the 1990s even though international organizations in general and the UN system in particular were hailed as the corner stones for the "new world order" after the end of the cold war. In IR, however, from the mid-1990s and onwards, networks, public-private partnerships and other new forms of global governance were the new buzz words which received most of the attention (Zürn 1998; Slaughter 2004; Börzel and Risse 2005; Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004).

While these institutional innovations are certainly interesting and fruitful objects of study, our understanding of the emerging post-1989 world order will remain incomplete without a focus on formal international organizations. One of the ironies is that international bureaucracies play significant roles in most "new forms of governance" (Witte and Reinicke 2005). Therefore the observation that "much of what is interesting about world politics … seemed to take place among intensely interdependent actors but beyond the purview of formal inter-state organizations" (Martin and Simmons 2002: 204) needs modification. Global governance does

[2] Quoted in Barnett and Finnemore (2004: VIII). See also Rochester (1986) and Verbeek (1998) for early critiques of the neglect of international organizations. Of course work on international organizations continued in political science but in small numbers and largely outside the discipline of international relations that regards the bulk of the descriptive and conceptually non-ambitious work on international organizations as merely *politikkundlich* but not *politikwissenschaftlich.* In the case of German IR it is remarkable that the theoretically informed introduction to the study of international organizations by Rittberger and Zangl (1994) was not followed by studies on international organizations along these lines. It is therefore not surprising that in a 2003 volume on the state of the art of German IR international organizations did not even receive a passing mention (Hellmann, Wolf and Zürn 2003). The chapter on "Internationale Regime und Institutionen" strictly limits itself to depicting the research on international regimes and does not make reference to international organizations (Sprinz 2003). In their chapter on "International Organizations and Institutions" in the *Handbook of International Relations* Martin and Simmons take a different point of view. They argue: "Formal organizations remain an important focus of research, especially in the post-cold War setting" (Martin and Simmons 2002: 193). However, the chapter still says very little about international organizations as *organizations.*

involve intensely interdependent actors, both public and private and goes beyond traditional inter-state politics. Still, in most of the crucial mechanisms of global governance – be they in security, political economy or sustainable development – it is formal international organizations and bureaucracies that play key roles. The ‘dinosaurs’ of the post-1945 world order are not quite threatened by extinction. For the time being they are here to stay – either as ineffective zombies of a bygone age or effective engines and catalysts for future global governance. Our ability to move towards effective and accountable global governance depends to a significant extent on whether international organizations can be reformed to better address the challenges of a world that is increasingly global, multipolar and interconnected and at the same time fragmented, unbalanced and risky. IR research can and should make a significant contribution to help make international bureaucracies part of the solution and not part of the problem of global governance. There is a strong need for theoretically informed and empirically grounded analyses of the performance of international bureaucracies. Such thorough analyses should be the basis for developing future scenarios and recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness and accountability of international bureaucracies.

So far, however, IR has contributed very little to meeting this demand. The fledgling renaissance of interest in international bureaucracies in recent years is a useful first step.[3] Even better news is the fact that new research aims to open up the “black box” of international organizations by treating IOs as organizations. This paper argues that in order to make the most out of this renewed interest we need to place work on international bureaucracies and their contribution to global governance at the heart of IR. As a first step, we outline key tenets and topics of the emerging research agenda on international bureaucracies. As a second step, we present the study of organizational learning within the UN Secretariat as a critical example of how to operationalize this interdisciplinary research agenda drawing on insights from different fields. Finally, we offer a perspective on the future challenges for this research agenda.

II. KEY TENETS AND TOPICS OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACIES

This section outlines the basic definitions, the core principles and goals as well as core themes for the emerging research agenda on international bureaucracies.

[3] Barnett and Finnemore (2004) is the key text for this renaissance. See also Barnett and Coleman (2005).

Definition of international bureaucracy

Max Weber saw bureaucracies as the ideal type of a 'specifically modern form of administration' (Weber 1980 (1921): 124). Weber emphasized the rational character of bureaucracies which makes them stand out.[4] Research in the Weberian tradition argues that bureaucracies have a number of core features: hierarchy ("each official has a clearly defined sphere of competence within a division of labor and is answerable to superiors", Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 17), continuity, impersonality ("the work is conducted according to prescribed rules and operating procedures", Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 18) and expertise. As Weber emphasized, knowledge and expertise are crucial characteristics of modern bureaucracies.[5]

This bureaucratic model also guided the creators of international organizations. They placed international bureaucracies at the core of the business of "international organization". Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 177) define an "international organization as an organization that has representatives from three or more states supporting a permanent secretariat to perform ongoing tasks related to a common purpose." States are the "principals", the international bureaucracy (often also called the "secretariat") is the "agent".[6] While international bureaucracies in principle follow the national bureaucratic model, there are also important differences. No national bureaucracy has to deal with 192 principals with often conflicting interests as is the case with the United Nations. The idea of an "international civil service" follows the principles of public service at the national level: competence, integrity, impartiality, independence and discretion. However, the multi-national composition and conflicting pressures over geographical representation give the international civil service a special character. Another important characteristic is that in addition to providing services to the principals (the member states) international bureaucracies (such as the UN Secretariat) also see themselves as having a special responsibility to defend and promote the principles enshrined in the charter.

---

[4] „Regel, Zweck, Mittel, 'sachliche' Unpersönlichkeit beherrschen ihr Gebaren" (Weber 1980 (1921): 578).

[5] „Bürokratische Verwaltung bedeutet: Herrschaft kraft Wissen" (Weber 1980 (1921): 129).

[6] This suggests that international bureaucracies can and should be analyzed by principal-agent-approaches. As a recent overview article aptly observes, principal-agent-theory driven work "contains a remarkably thin view of agent behaviour" (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 277). As a consequence, principal-agent theorists have made very few direct claims about agent behaviour. More than 20 years ago, Oliver Williamson coined the memorable phrase that agents are "self-interest seeking with guile" (quoted in Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 277). However, subsequent principal-agent-theory inspired research has not fleshed out or tested this assertion. Hawkins and Jacoby (2006: 279) are the first principal-agent theorists to claim that "IOs matter not only because states have designed rules to resolve problems, but because those IOs are themselves independent actors and interact strategically with states and others." However, the tools they propose (associating leverage of IOs with situations in which only a small pool of agents exists and high costs are associated with the creation of agents) contribute very little to the analysis of long-term processes such as organizational learning.

Understanding and explaining international bureaucracies is of course not a completely new concern. The end of the Second World War and the birth of the UN system introduced the first wave of research on international organization. As early as 1945, Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer published his classic work *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* tracing the history of the League of Nations' Secretariat. Ranshofen-Wertheimer argued that the lesson to be drawn from the League's history was that "it is possible to establish an integral body of international officials, loyal to the international agency and ready to discharge faithfully the international obligations incumbent upon them. It was not for lack of executive efficiency that the League system failed" (quoted in Fosdick 1946: 692). With the creation of the European Community, EC research (chiefly that of the neo-functionalist variety advanced by Ernst B. Haas) placed a special emphasis on the role of the Commission as an emerging supranational bureaucracy. The 1970s saw a renewed interest in international bureaucracies with the publication of a special issue on *Towards an International Civil Service* by the *Public Administration Review* as well as a select number of studies such as Thomas G. Weiss' *International Bureaucracy* (Weiss 1975). Weiss' study starts out by observing that "there have been too few critical case studies of international secretariats and inadequate theoretical efforts to determine the relevance of present international bureaucracy for future global welfare" (Weiss 1975: XV).

The thirty years that followed Weiss' work saw few efforts to fill the research gap.[7] It is only in recent years that international bureaucracies have reappeared on the on the bookshelves. These include "tell-all" UN-bashing books such as Eric Shawn's (2006) *The UN Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America's Security and Fails the World* or Pedro A. Sanjuan's (2005) *The UN Gang: A Memoir of Incompetence, Corruption, Espionage, Anti-Semitism and Islamic Extremism at the UN Secretariat*. On the opposite end of the political spectrum we find the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP), official histories of UN agencies such as Craig N. Murphy's (2006) study on the UN Development Programme as well the short history of the UN Secretariat by Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott (2007). Other publications include investigations on the conduct of the UN bureaucracy by the Volcker Commission and the US Government Accountability Office as well as academic works such as Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) *Rules for the World: International Organizations in*

[7] Important sources are also earlier critical insider accounts such as Hazzard (1973) and memoirs of UN officials such as Brian Urquhart's *A Life in Peace and War* (Urquhart 1987).

Global Politics and John Mathiason's (2007) *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in World Politics*.[8]

However, studies of international bureaucracies that combine high academic quality with practical relevance are still very rare. The field of International Relations (IR) in particular still produces very few of these. Therefore is it imperative to put the study of international bureaucracies and their contribution to global governance to its rightful place at the heart of the discipline of IR. In order to "open up the black box" of international bureaucracies it is not enough simply to resort to structural descriptions of international administrative institutions that informed much of the first wave of scholarship from the 1950s to the early 1970s; nor will it suffice to single-mindedly pursue a "rational science of institutional design" (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001). The critical challenge is to formulate a coherent research agenda that is theoretically and conceptually ambitious, empirically rich and practically relevant. This requires IR scholars to broaden their analytical framework taking into account the following principles and guiding questions.

Key Research Goals and Principles

In this vein, research on international bureaucracies should follow three guiding principles.

- *Problem driven*: Rather than merely using international bureaucracies as a testing ground for theories and models, research should seek to address challenges emerging from the work of international bureaucracies and closely examine their make-up or dysfunctions.
- *Rigorous but not rigid:* Research should be rigorous in the sense that it rests on clearly stated conceptual and methodological premises which take into account standards of scholarship developed in IR over the past decades. This means that research should not content itself with the description of the formal make-up of international bureaucracies which informed most of the early scholarship on the topic (although an understanding of this formal core is an essential starting point for any thorough analysis). At the same time, a rigorous approach should not degenerate into counterproductive rigidity. Today often outside the parameters of mainstream IR, an explicitly normative approach can be "extremely useful, providing it is based on frankly articulated value premises and astute analysis" (Gould and Kelman 1970:

[8] For an overview see Liese and Weinlich (2006).

245).[9] Therefore, any successful research agenda will have to include analysis as well as normative-prescriptive elements. A rigorous non-rigid approach also calls for bridging the exaggerated divide between "rationalist" and "constructivist" approaches. As Robert Keohane pointed out, "rationalism and constructivism have more in common than stylizations of them as containing different ontologies would suggest" (Keohane 2006: 76). Therefore we should seek "to integrate their insights rather than pitting them against one another in a gladiatorial contest" (ibid.). Research on international bureaucracies can, should and must do exactly that, in order to be comprehensive (see also Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006; Tierney and Weaver Forthcoming).

- *Interdisciplinary*: Traditional IR approaches alone have a rather limited capacity to shed light on international organizations as organizations. Therefore, research on international bureaucracies must be truly interdisciplinary in order to provide an insightful perspective. Law, economics, history, social anthropology, social psychology, sociology, and public administration can all make potentially important contributions. In particular, the research agenda on international bureaucracies presents both the need and the opportunity to leverage the (as of yet untapped) potential of organizational theory and public administration for IR.

When following these three principles, research on international bureaucracies should be mindful of the context and the big picture. Inspired by Imre Lakatos, Kratochwil and Ruggie argue that a "progressive problem shift" should inform the analytical foci of any new research program (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 754). This means that these shifts can only be "progressive and cumulative" if they are "guided by an overriding concern with what has always preoccupied students of international organization: how the modern society of nations governs itself." (ibid.: 774). It is therefore important to firmly anchor research on international bureaucracies in overall research on global governance (see also Dingwerth and Campe 2006; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007). This also ensures that research on international bureaucracies no longer remains a fringe activity but is connected with and relevant for all key debates and research in the field of IR.

[9] As Seibel argues: „Tatsächlich ist die rein normative Betrachtung steril, sie kann die Voraussetzung für die Verwirklichung ihrer Vorsätze nicht selbst benennen" (Seibel 2003: 224).

Key Research Topics and Questions

Research on international bureaucracies should move away from a singular focus on questions such as "Why do states create international bureaucracies?" or "Do international bureaucracies matter at all in an anarchical international system?" Instead, increased focus should be placed on the actual work of international bureaucracies. This is a much less defensive and more productive starting point for understanding the work of international bureaucracies as organizations and their contribution to effective and accountable global governance.[10] In order to improve our understanding of international bureaucracies in a problem-driven, yet systematic fashion, the following issue areas need further in-depth research.

- *Internal structure and governance*: Understanding the basic governing structure of an international bureaucracy and its internal dynamics is a precondition for any thorough analysis on the work of international bureaucracies. These include the division into subunits, intra-organizational coordination mechanisms (including headquarter-field interaction), budget and financial planning, recruitment and career development, knowledge management and IT systems, the ideals and realities of an "international public service", and "organizational culture".[11]
- *The role of leadership and its challenges*: Almost 40 years ago, Robert Cox (1969: 205) argued that the "quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization". Although Cox expressed the hope that "the history of international organization may provide elements for a theory of leadership" (ibid.), very little progress has been noted

[10] It is important to zoom in on the *inter*action between principals and agents. In its fervor to demonstrate the influence of the agent (i.e. the international bureaucracy) research sometimes tends to fall into the trap of building a reverse principal-agent model *just* focusing on the influence of the agent on certain policy outcomes that a simplistic principal-agent approach would ascribe to principals. Liese and Weinlich (2006: 13), for example, identify the question "ob, und wenn ja, warum internationale Verwaltungen das Handeln von internationalen Organisationen mitbestimmen statt lediglich die Interessen mächtiger Staaten zu vertreten oder im Dienste des gemeinsamen Nenners staatlicher Interesse zu stehen" as the core concern of research on international bureaucracies. While this should certainly be an important part of the agenda, it should not be its sole focus. And the very phrasing of the research question reveals a defensive posture driven mainly by the arguments between realists, rational institutionalists and constructivist institutionalists and not by concerns with the actual performance of international bureaucracies.

[11] Organizational culture is a notoriously imprecise term. Nielson et al. defined it as follows for the case of the World Bank: "We define organizational culture here as the shared ideologies, norms, and routines that shape staff members' expectations about how agendas are set, mandates are operationalized, projects are implemented and evaluated, and what staff behavior will be rewarded or punished in promotions and demotions. Organizational culture also influences the worldview of Bank staff, shaping the way they understand the meaning of 'development' and the role or identity of the Bank in promoting development. Likewise, organizational culture affects how Bank staff respond to or proactively engage the demands and pressures in their external authorizing and task environment" (Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006: 109)..

in this direction. Mainstream political science has mostly ignored the topic of leadership and delegated it to a cottage industry in business administration (Seibel 2003: 228). The problem with this approach has been characterized well by James G. March who wrote: “I doubt that ‘leadership’ is a useful concept for serious scholarship. The idea of leadership is imposed on our interpretation of history by our human myths, or by the way we think that history is supposed to be described” (March 2006: 85). March argues that “until a link to significant scholarship can be made, the thinking on leadership will produce more (…) homilies and tautologies than powerful ideas” (ibid.).[12] Better understanding of leadership and the characteristics of bureaucratic actors in general will greatly add to our understanding of organizational outcomes and should allow solid inferences on a whole range of other factors, such as learning and organizational change.

- *Interaction with immediate principals*: The internal governance of an international bureaucracy cannot be successfully understood in isolation of its environment. It is necessary to analyze how it interacts with immediate principals, i.e. member-state governments and principal organs in which member state governments are represented. Any analysis of the “autonomy” of international secretariats should be nuanced to take into account varying forms and degrees of autonomy. International bureaucracies might “act independently from, but consistently with, state interests, interpreting mandates and implementing policy in ways that are perhaps unanticipated but agreeable to states. They also might operate in areas to which states are indifferent. They might fail to carry out state interests, oppose state interests, or change state interests” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 11). This explains why it is critical to expand the traditional focus of IR scholars and zoom in on the way international bureaucracies engage with other players in global governance.

- *Authority of international bureaucracies*: As Barnett and Finnemore argue, “authority provides the substance of which IOs are made” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 21). International bureaucracies are said to exhibit at least three forms of authority: delegated authority (e.g. mandates given to bureaucracies by member states), moral authority (international bureaucracies as guardians, embodiments and preachers of a set of principles), and expert authority (the expertise and specialized knowledge that

[12] The few examples of research discussing leadership in international bureaucracies include John Ruggie’s analysis of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annnan as a “norm entrepreneur”, the cursory discussion of leadership in Mathiason (2007: chapter 3) and Bauer (2006: 31) as well as the edited volumes on the UN Secretary General by Chesterman (2007) and Kille (2006).

persuades us to "confer on experts and the bureaucracies that house them, the authority to make judgments and solve problems", ibid.: 24). In-depth research on the authority of international bureaucracies also presents an opportunity to advance the study of power in global governance. For example, the taxonomy of compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power suggested by Barnett and Duvall (2005) is a useful starting point to examine the interactions of power and authority between states, international bureaucracies and other actors in global governance.

- *Interaction with "new" actors and engagement in new forms of governance:* Research should also better illuminate the interaction international bureaucracies have with non-state actors, e.g. civil society organizations, corporations and academia and how they affect each other. Also, the engagement of international bureaucracies in "new forms of global governance", e.g. public-private partnerships and global public policy networks, needs further study. When, why and how do bureaucracies engage in these new forms? How does their role change (e.g. more toward facilitators, convenors and capacity-builders, Benner and Witte 2001)?

- *Inter-organizational relations*: It is also crucial to address issues of coordination and competition, duplication and complementarity between different international bureaucracies in the same or related policy fields. This problem has been with the UN system since its creation. Its history is littered with attempts to improve inter-organizational coherence and cooperation, most recently the "One U.N." initiative within the United Nations development system. Research should also clarify when competition between different international bureaucracies is useful (as argued for example by Ruth Wedgwood for the case of the UN, Wedgwood 2005a, 2005b) and when it is detrimental.

- *Accountability and legitimacy*: International bureaucracies have come under fire for their "democratic deficit" – from both the right and the left.[13] The challenge for researchers is to combine a solid analysis of existing accountability systems of international bureaucracies with policy prescriptions for improving the accountability systems based on clearly spelt out normative premises. In doing so, researchers should move beyond the false choice between a backward-looking nationalism that advocates 'retaking our sovereignty' and a textbook version of participatory democracy taken to the cosmopolitan level. Rather, research needs to be more measured in its metric and

[13] The following builds on Benner (forthcoming).

more creative in its remedies (Grant and Keohane 2005; Keohane 2006). Researchers should not be prisoners of a restrictive domestic analogy when developing new accountability tools and mechanisms, nor should they fall into the trap of indiscriminately adding multiple layers of accountability demands. This only leads to what Jonathan Koppell (2005) calls the "multiple accountabilities disorder" (MAD) syndrome.

- *Impact and evaluation:* Efficiency and effectiveness of international bureaucracies are notoriously unclear and underoperationalized concepts (Dicke 1994: 352). While impact evaluation for particular programs and activities has become a growth industry, that is only a modest first step toward assessing an organization's overall efficiency, effectiveness (efficacy), relevance and impact. So far, there is very little research on evaluation work in and of international bureaucracies. Three promising avenues for scholarly work would therefore be to first evaluate the evaluation work of international bureaucracies, second through studies determine the impact of the work of international bureaucracies and third to develop better analytical tools for evaluation. As a starting point, evaluation practice needs to be assessed according to the quality not the quantity of the information compiled. As Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane argue, the effectiveness of evaluation itself depends on "the extent to which the institution provides reliable information needed for grappling with normative disagreement and uncertainty" (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 426). This includes the public justification for controversial and consequential actions and policies.

- *Change and reform*: It is striking that "we have so little systematic understanding of the factors and conditions that determine the changes" of the internal management of international bureaucracies (Bauer 2007: 11). This is due to the neglect of important issues such as institutional changes within international bureaucracies on the part of both IR scholars and public administrations respectively. It is only recently that changes within international bureaucracies received some attention (Barnett and Coleman 2005; Weaver and Leiteritz 2005). Within this emerging body of research, the study of "reform" as a process of deliberate efforts to change international bureaucracies has received special attention (Bauer and Knill 2007). A number of studies have sought to explain the reasons for reform by treating it as a dependent variable. They identified several factors that could prompt reform: the dissatisfaction of principal actors, efforts on the part of the bureaucracy to carve out policy autonomy, increasing scrutiny by national constituencies, struggle for survival, normal life cycle and the influence of state-of-the-art public management principles of a hegemony dominating the international bureaucracy (Bauer 2007: 15-16). Precious little research exists on the consequences of reform efforts, i.e. its impact on policy outputs as well as its unintended consequences. Research also needs to investigate how the translation and application of private sector formed management models for international bureaucracies. Further research also needs to analyze the rhetoric of reform and contrast the tropes of reform with implementation as well as the contradictions in the sense of “organized hypocrisy” (Brunsson 2002; Lipson 2007).

- *Institutional design:* Institutional design is a particular variant of the focus on change and reform. As Alexander Wendt points out, IR has spent little energy on issues as institutional design although “designing institutions has been a big part of what foreign policymakers actually do” (Wendt 2001: 1019). The rational design of institutions project, in fields other than IR, dedicated itself to explain why actors chose certain designs of institutions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001). Wendt argues that “we need kinds of knowledge that go beyond the causes of institutional design, and we need two in particular: knowledge about institutional effectiveness” and “knowledge about values”, i.e. what goals we should pursue (Wendt 2001: 1043). Knowledge about effectiveness can tell us how and why certain design choices worked or failed. As Wendt writes “we need to think harder about the nature of the design problem, its differences from our traditional social scientific concern with explanation, and the implications for the kind of knowledge we seek to produce.” (ibid.: 1049). Ultimately, the hope is that this “will lead eventually to a more forward-looking, practical social science” (ibid.: 1049).
- *Learning:* We use the topic of learning in international bureaucracies as an example for an in-depth discussion in the following section. We chose organizational learning for three reasons. First, in recent years international bureaucracies have increasingly tried to turn themselves into “learning organizations” putting greater emphasis on knowledge management. At the same time, the few available studies indicate that international bureaucracies have not been particularly good at learning. For the area of multidimensional peace operations, one of the leading comprehensive studies for example concludes that learning “has not […] been one of the strengths of the United Nations. A senior Secretariat official describes this as an unwritten rule that ‘no wheel shall go un-reinvented’” (Chesterman 2004: 256). Further research is needed for a

detailed process tracing of (non-)learning in international bureaucracies to determine the factors that enable and hinder learning in international bureaucracies. Second, research on organizational learning offers a prime example for both the need and the difficulties of truly interdisciplinary work bringing together IR with approaches from organization theory and public administration. Third, from a normative standpoint we believe that organizational learning is a desirable goal for international bureaucracies. As Peter M. and Ernst Haas point out, “[in] the absence of a dominant state willing to lead, a strong shared universal vision, or a world government, collective responses to the global problematique depend on international institutional mechanisms. Only flexible institutions with expanding organizational visions can respond effectively to these problems. (…) While ad hoc and disjointed responses to these challenges are likely to occur through most processes of international relations, robust and resilient responses are possible in multilateral settings characterized by well-developed processes of organizational learning” (Haas and Haas 1995: 256). Research should be in a position to help international bureaucracies make some progress toward this ideal.

III. STUDYING ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACIES: PROMISES AND PITFALLS

The paucity of research on organizational learning in international bureaucracies

Do international bureaucracies learn? Which factors influence their capacity to learn? It is surprising that very few studies attempted to answer these essential questions. In the field of IR, the pioneering work of Ernst Haas has been a towering exception (Haas 1990; Haas and Haas 1995). In the past 20 years, preciously few IR scholars have decided to take up the issues laid out in Haas’ innovative typology of learning in international bureaucracies. Research on organizational learning in other disciplines has ignored international bureaucracies as legitimate research objects. The two most prominent volumes which took stock of research on organizational learning did not make any reference to international bureaucracies (Dierkes et al. 2001; Easterby-Smith 2005).

The reasons for this have mainly to do with the path-dependence of research programs and the lack of cross-fertilization across different academic communities. Research on organizational learning started out by focusing on private sector institutions – a focus that presented itself as deserving attention given the fact that a significant part of organization researchers migrated to business school environments in the second half of the 20th century. Companies were also ready to embrace approaches of "knowledge management" and become "learning organizations" as proposed by management thinkers. Furthermore, companies also had an incentive to open up to researchers in order to get outside expertise on how well they were doing on their path to organizational learning. Hence, researchers of organizational learning had an easy time finding willing corporations that would make for good case studies. In the 1980s and early 1990s, this could not be said of international bureaucracies. Even rhetorically, international bureaucracies made very few efforts to present themselves as knowledge-based organizations and highly political international bureaucracies did not make a point to invite external researchers.

In the past 10 years this picture has changed considerably. Many international bureaucracies, starting with the World Bank and UNDP, have caught up with private sector rhetoric and now present themselves as knowledge-based organizations that are making significant efforts to develop and implement knowledge management systems. They have readily adopted the language of "best practices" and "lessons learned" inspired by the management literature. Even latecomers to this game such as the UN peace operations bureaucracy at DPKO and beyond now place a particular emphasis on doctrine development and new tools of knowledge sharing, such as building up a sophisticated intranet with a modern database and supporting virtual "communities of practice" for the horizontal exchange of experience among peers (Benner and Rotmann 2008).

One might assume that this would have transformed international bureaucracies into attractive objects of study for students of organizational learning in both IR and related disciplines. An increasing number of recent studies indeed point to a growing interest in studying organizational learning in international bureaucracies (Senghaas-Knobloch, Dirks and Liese 2003; Breul 2005; Brown, Kenney and Zarkin 2006; Böhling 2007; Howard forthcoming 2008; Seibel et al. 2007; Benner, Binder and Rotmann 2007).[14]

Developing a research framework: key challenges

The diversity of approaches adopted by these studies underline the challenges of developing a research framework that allows for an easy comparison of the findings and results. Toward

[14] There is also now a series of studies that apply organizational learning approaches to military bureaucracies such as the U.S. Army (Rid 2007) or the U.S. and the British Army in comparative perspective (Nagl 2005).

this end, research on organizational learning in international bureaucracies should address the following concerns.

Confronting bias: As critics have pointed out, research on learning often suffers from a crypto-normative bias.[15] To the extent that explicitly normative research has gone out of fashion, studying learning might provide a convenient way to bring in normative concerns through the backdoor. Scholars succumb to crypto-normative bias when they use learning as a synonym for their own expectations of best behavior of international organizations. To move away from such crypto-normativism, normative judgments on whether the content of learning is desirable or not should represent only a second and optional step and build on a solid analysis of learning processes. Research also needs to move away from a scientific and technocratic bias that informs much of the scholarship on organizational learning in international bureaucracies. A number of studies assume the following model: An epistemic community, a group of like-minded scientists, reaches a consensus on (re-)conceptualizing a problem and an adequate response (e.g. how chlorofluorocarbons damage the ozone layer and how we can avert this). An enlightened international bureaucracy adopts this scientific wisdom and thereby "learns". In some cases (especially with regard to certain environmental problems) this is certainly a viable model. But this model is of far less relevance when it comes to fields where there is no clear-cut scientific consensus within an "epistemic community". This is for example the case with multidimensional peace operations. As of now, there is no "science of peacebuilding" producing consensus on how to deal with the complex challenge of building a lasting peace after conflicts. Also, there is the possibility of different, possibly competing factions within an international bureaucracy drawing strategically on approaches offered by scientists.

Confronting conceptual fuzziness and proliferation: There is no generally accepted definition of organizational learning. Organizational learning is at present more akin to a widely applied metaphor than to the bedrock of a well developed research paradigm. This is a reflection of both the level of fragmentation of research on organizational learning and the inherent complexity of the process of learning itself. Transferring the concept of learning from the individual to the organizational level adds to the challenges of clearly defining and operationalizing the concept. A definition of organizational learning in line with the outlined challenges therefore needs to meet the two following criteria. First, its basic elements must

[15] Markus Jachtenfuchs alerted us to this problem in his presentation at the joint WZB/GPPi workshop *International Organizations and Organizational Learning: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges* in Berlin on 23 April 2007.

allow for operationalization, rather than remaining at the level of a metaphor. Second, it should build on concepts already in use instead of creating additional ones, while at the same time adapting them to the context of international organizations.

Adapting concepts from other disciplines: The lack of analytical approaches in IR dealing with the internal workings of international organizations necessitates borrowing from organizational learning (OL), a subfield of organization theory (for an overview see Berthoin Antal et al. 2001; Easterby-Smith 2005). However, organization theory itself does not offer tested models tailored to the analysis of learning in international bureaucracies. There are two reasons for this. First, the field of organizational learning suffers from a significant degree of heterogeneity. In the words of two leading contributors to this literature:

> "Research in organizational learning has suffered from conceptions that were excessively broad, encompassing nearly all organizational change, from ontological complaints that organizations cannot learn, and from various other maladies that arise from insufficient agreement among those working in the area on key concepts and problems" (Cohen and Sproull 1991: Editor's introduction).

Second, the literature on organizational learning almost exclusively focuses on business organizations, often relying on quasi-Darwinian market forces as explanatory factors while critically under-emphasizing the political factors in organizational processes. The analogy does not hold; international organizations rarely operate in a market-like environment where they are likely to go out of business based on the forces of supply and demand. While the OL literature does not offer a tailor-made framework for the analysis of international bureaucracies, it is useful to rely on elements of the current OL literature for two purposes: as building blocks for our heuristic model of learning, and to deduce hypotheses on the key factors that affect learning. To this end, the more recent literature on OL is more promising as it clearly demarcates itself from earlier approaches on two fronts: on the one hand, the traditional understanding of organizations as closed systems in the 1970s gave way to a more open concept that allowed for the interaction between an organization and its environment; on the other hand, the new scholarly recognition of such interaction remained limited to a one-way relation, namely, that the institutional environment determines the organization's goals and the instruments to reach them. On the contrary, more recent approaches see the organization and its environment as mutually constitutive (Breul 2005; Dingwerth and Campe 2006; Meyer and Scott 1992; Scott and Meyer 1994).[16]

[16] This is in line with sociological institutionalists considering structure and agency as mutual constitutive (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Ulbert 2003; Wendt 1987).

Research also needs to take into account other relevant approaches from organization theory for our analysis of the learning process.[17] This includes the "bounded rationality" literature (March and Simon 1958), the "garbage can model" (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972/1988; Lipson 2004; March and Olsen 1976) and the model of "muddling through," multiple streams, and "organized hypocrisy" (Brunsson 2002; Lipson 2007) as a response to conflicting pressures. These models deal with decision-making in bureaucracies and can therefore inform our analysis of factors influencing the process of organizational learning.

In the following sections, we present one approach to the study of organizational learning. We developed this approach for the analysis of organizational learning in the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy, centered on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN field missions (Benner, Binder and Rotmann 2007).[18]

Defining organizational learning in international bureaucracies

The majority of recent research on organizational learning rightly rejects both simple behavioral stimulus-response models and models that analyze organizations as closed systems independent of their environment.[19] An OL approach to international bureaucracies should build on the following premises:

1. organizational learning is a *collective process* driven by groups of individuals;[20]
2. organizational learning is a process with a *strong cognitive dimension* (Klimecki, Laßleben and Thomae 1999), in which
3. the organization *interacts with its environment* and that
4. manifests itself in the *acquisition of knowledge* and the *development of new rules and routines*.

In this vein, organizational learning should be defined as a process of knowledge-based change through the questioning of the means and/or ends of addressing problems. The process

[17] On these issues, the work of the project on *Administrative Science Meets Peacekeeping* at the University of Konstanz is very instructive. For the following also see Seibel (2005) and Seibel et al (2007).
[18] This ongoing study (February 2007-January 2009) that is funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF) seeks to analyze learning processes over seven years (2001-2007) in four distinct issue areas: police (within the area of security), judicial reform (within the area of governance), reintegration of ex-combatants (within the area of welfare) and mission integration (as a cross-cutting issue). Further information is available at http://www.gppi.net/research/learning_to_build_peace/.

[19] The following builds on Benner, Binder and Rotmann (2007).
[20] It is taken as a given that individuals in an organization learn – however, learning becomes only consequential at the group and organizational levels. A detailed examination of the learning processes within an international bureaucracy therefore starts at the group level.

manifests itself in the acquisition of knowledge and reviewing of experience, leading towards the development and implementation of new rules and routines for the organization's actions. A process is considered learning only if the negotiations about these new rules and routines are significantly based on reflection and knowledge. A change of rules and routines that *only* occurs due to a change in power relations should not be included in the definition of organizational learning. The difficulty of tracing the interaction between power and knowledge is evident, and clearly power is always part and parcel of organizational learning processes. However, a cognitive component is essential to this conception of organizational learning and also helps to distinguish organizational learning from other forms of changes in rules and routines.

This definition combines the knowledge-based approach of Haas (1990) with that of Barnett and Finnemore (2004) who focus on the importance of rules as the basic modus operandi of international bureaucracies. According to the latter, "bureaucratic rules are the standard operating procedures that allow the organization to respond more effectively and predictably to environmental demands" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 18). Change of rules applies to a broad continuum from operational procedures to grand doctrines.

The focal organization and its environment

Any heuristic model for the analysis of organizational learning needs to distinguish the focal organization (in our case the peacebuilding bureaucracy centered around DPKO) from its environment.[21] The focal organization and its environment are linked by so-called boundary spanning units (Dierkes et al. 2001; Thompson 1967). The environment is an important source of information and knowledge for the organization. As Haas points out, "international organizations are deeply enmeshed with and dependent on their environment" (Haas 1990: 207). Boundary spanning units operate at the interface between the external environment and the bureaucracy, facilitating the flow of information and knowledge. Ansell and Weber argue that "[a]ll organizations develop such actors [boundary spanners], sometimes individuals and sometimes large subsets of the organization. They aim at modulating, regulating, and sometimes controlling what kinds of resources, signals, information, and ideas pass in and pass out […] of the organization" (Ansell and Weber 1999: 82).

[21] In the particular case of a study that chooses to focus its research on a sub-unit within an international bureaucracy (the peacebuilding bureaucracy within the UN Secretariat), it is possible to distinguish between an internal environment (within the UN system) and an external environment (beyond the UN system).

For most international bureaucracies, the immediate environment is composed of intergovernmental bodies representing member states. Important external information for an international bureaucracy is often also provided by non-state actors, such as NGOs, think tanks or even academics. Whereas the classical conception of boundary spanning units pictures them as expert groups composed of actors belonging to the international bureaucracy and to the external environment (Böhling 2005), Ansell and Weber (1999) also point to the growing relevance of international consulting firms as boundary spanners. Indeed, international organizations frequently rely on outside consultants for evaluating programs and developing lessons learned studies.[22]

Types of learning

OL scholars have proposed a number of ways to distinguish different types or dimensions of learning. The most common approach is based on different qualities of learning that are generally defined in metaphorical terms. The dichotomy between 'single-loop' and 'double-loop' learning, for example, contrasts learning processes that take place within a given set of rules and a given organizational structure with those that lead to the creation of entirely new procedures, approaches, or strategies (Argyris and Schön 1978). This rigid distinction of qualities of learning has proven hard to operationalize and has attracted considerable criticism (Nonaka 1994), as the empirical picture suggests more of a continuum than a sharp divide between such poles.

As an alternative we suggest two dimensions for distinguishing different types of learning. The first dimension relates to the levels of organizational hierarchy a learning process involves. This distinction builds on the hypothesis that hierarchy and external political influence have an effect on learning processes. Depending on what is being learned (or not) and the significance accorded to the matter by the organization, a learning process might reach different levels of hierarchy and politicization. At the working level, immediate reactions to problems or implementation of knowledge within a departmental unit or a field mission constitute a type of less formalized low-level learning. Mid-level learning has broader reach and involves the departmental level, often using or producing more elaborate outcomes such as articles, reports or reviews (Rid 2007: 43). This, however, does not involve the top leadership or require member state authorization, as would be the case for top-level systemic

[22] The annex of this paper provides an example of visualizing this model using the case of the UN peacebuilding apparatus (Fig. 1).

learning. This type of learning involves top-management decisions and member state consent on new doctrines, reallocation of resources, or redesign of organizational structures.

A second important distinction might be between analytic and normative dimensions of learning. The analytic dimension refers to what is “true” or “false” or what “works” or “does not work”, while the normative dimension refer to what is “good” or “bad”. For example, in a matter as inherently political yet also practical as peacebuilding, few issues are entirely analytical or entirely normative. However, whether an attempt to learn is seen as more as a “pragmatic improvement” or an “ideological quest” will decisively shape its reception by other members of the organization.

Stages of the learning process

Similarly to many common models in OL (and very much in line with the model of a policy cycle), we propose three functional stages of the learning process (Crossan, Lane and White 1999; March and Olsen 1976): (1) *knowledge acquisition*, (2) *advocacy/decision-making*, and (3) *institutionalization*. Ideally, these three phases would add up to a learning cycle, i.e. the institutionalized rules would be subject of continuous review and further learning.

1. *Knowledge Acquisition:* Initially, the organization either actively searches for or passively receives knowledge from the external environment, or converts its own previous experience into knowledge.

2. *Advocacy/decision-making:* After knowledge acquisition, the carriers of knowledge spread the word about the new knowledge in the organization and develop knowledge-based proposals for new rules. Building coalitions and negotiating the relevance of their new knowledge and rule-changing proposals, they try to convince key people to accept their newly acquired knowledge *and* its implications for rule adaptation. In this phase it will be examined how knowledge is formed into proposals for new rules and how these proposals gain (or do not gain) momentum within the organization. The advocacy stage ends with an authoritative decision on whether and how to change the rules.

3. *Institutionalization:* Once a decision has been taken, it must be codified and implemented. The new rules are integrated within the existing body of rules and disseminated among concerned units and staff. The learning process is completed when the newly made rules are applied. In an ideal learning process the implementation is followed by an evaluation of the new rule which activates a feedback loop and the learning process restarts.

Of course this is only a stylized model which does not allow us to make predictions on how different factors influence individual processes of learning and non-learning. Research needs to take into account incomplete learning cycles. It is an empirical question to determine where learning processes are typically interrupted and why.

Influences on learning

Existing research points to a multitude of “factors”, “conditions”, “antecedents” and “triggers” that are in one way or another said to be causally linked to learning (Babuji and Crossan 2004; Dodgson 1993; Huber 1991; Senghaas-Knobloch, Dirks and Liese 2003). In contrast to approaches focusing on single dominant causes or *triggers of learning* (most often a crisis, see Breul 2005: chapter 3.2), we believe that a more fine-grained process tracing, analyzing different factors that (co-)influence learning/non-learning has the potential of presenting a much richer analysis of organizational learning.[23] This is not to say that crises do not provide opportunities for learning. The history of UN peacebuilding operations, for example, shows ample evidence of stalled learning processes that were only released through severe crises. However, focusing on additional, less obvious factors can shed light on the enabling and constraining conditions for learning in the absence of crisis, that is, in everyday bureaucratic and political practice.

A number of studies point to the importance of the institutional set-up of IOs for learning processes. These approaches argue that the ultimate political control of member states over the bureaucracy’s actions and the political power constraints involved in intergovernmental decision-making make IOs a very distinctive learning system. With regards to learning in political organizations in general, LaPalombara for example notes that “on the principal’s side, there may not be sufficient time, or technical competence, or interest to learn what is actually going on with policy implementation. On the agent’s side, whatever is learned about policy implementation that might urge a change of methods or of the policy itself may never be articulated at all, for to do so might upset an existing political equilibrium” (LaPalombara 2001: 565). This is not to say that learning never occurs on the bureaucratic level and that it never succeeds in rallying member state support for new policies. Indeed the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy is an example where lack of guidance has led implementers to

[23] This is underlined by Hannan and Freeman who assert that “organizational outcomes depend heavily on internal politics, on the balance of power among the constituencies. When such an organization faces an external problem, which action will be taken, if any, depends as much on the coalition structure of the organization as on the contribution of alternative actions to organizational survival or growth. In such situations outcomes cannot be easily matched rationally to changing environments” (Hannan and Freeman 1989: 23 quoted in Pierson, 2004: 126).

shape policy to a great extent. Nonetheless, LaPalombara's argument points towards important structural constraints on learning in the public as opposed in the private sector.

More generally, the lack of networking capability and communication management is often referred to as an obstacle to learning in large organizations. Kim uses the term "fragmented learning" to describe situations where individuals or sub-units of an organization learn, but institutional constraints prevent the whole organization from completing the learning cycle (Kim 1993: 46). This could potentially be a typical feature of very decentralized organizations, such as large international bureaucracies spread over many duty stations or field missions, that are lacking effective capacities to provide for one actor or unit's learning to be transmitted into the organization as a whole.

The study of bureaucratic politics has repeatedly pointed to the fact that often the "right" and most appropriate policies are not pursued by bureaucracies because individual bureaucratic actors pursue their own interests (Allison and Zelikow 1999). According to these models, bureaucratic actors want to maximize their influence, power, or competences and therefore contribute to the distortion of a "rational" political outcome. For example experience might have proven that a particular service could be more efficiently delivered by a different department or working unit. Due to bureaucratic politics, the original provider of the service will be an internal advocate against the implementation of the learning and depending on his power position may also completely or partly hinder the learning process. This is a case where IR approaches based on strategic interaction can shed light on learning processes.

The role of power is another important factor for learning in international bureaucracies that are often highly political or politicized. It is difficult to trace this influence on learning in international bureaucracies, particularly when it is exerted in a "hidden" or unconscious way (Lukes 1974). For example, officials within the bureaucracy might unconsciously self-censor potential sources of learning in the face of opposition to it by a well-known member state. Thus, certain knowledge and experience gains might be discarded simply because they are perceived to be outside the range of politically acceptable options within the current power structure. Etheredge raises this as a general problem for learning in political organizations, holding that it is often unclear "what the government should learn and what it should not learn" (Etheredge 1981: 86). Learning of politically unwelcome lessons, even if these might be backed by the latest available knowledge and self-reflection, is thus unlikely because of underlying power structures.

Several other constraining or enabling influences on learning are mentioned in the OL literature (Babuji and Crossan 2004; Dodgson 1993; Huber 1991). These include aspects such as organizational culture, leadership, human capital, organizational structure, staff mobility and fluctuation, technical infrastructure for knowledge management, and access to external knowledge. Further research is necessary to systematically assess the factors influencing learning in international bureaucracies. This research should systematically analyze variation between different cases: can we observe variation across issue areas (e.g. highly politicized security issues vs. more technocratic issue areas)? Are there certain patterns of factors and characteristics that are particularly prone to enabling/hindering learning? Can we observe processes of learning at the intergovernmental level (e.g. within the UN's principal organs)? Another intriguing (and hard to answer) question is what impact learning has on the performance of international bureaucracies.

Building Learning Organizations? Pitfalls and Pathologies

Rather than blindly subscribing to the rush to build "learning organizations" on the basis of business management models, students of organizational learning in international bureaucracies should be mindful of the problems and pathologies associated with the use and management of knowledge in international bureaucracies. Potential pathologies include the "interest in ignorance" on the part of agents and principals about the true performance of international bureaucracies (Seibel 1996). Therefore learning efforts might amount to no more than just window-dressing.

Some also point to the problems associated with too large a fragmentation of knowledge between headquarters and the field or different kinds of agencies working on the same problem (e.g. military, development and humanitarian actors working on peacebuilding). Others take the opposite view and decry the dangers of coherence and generalization. Michael Barnett, for example, argues that the bread-and-butter business of an international bureaucracy such as the UN, namely determining and operating on universal and generalized rules, is fraught with problems. Barnett argues that bureaucratic universalism is dangerous: "In order to be the rationalized, efficient actors that they present themselves to be, [UN officials] must flatten diversity and ignore contextual variations. (…) Generalized knowledge that overlooks local contexts can lead to a tremendous mismatch between the activities of international actors and the needs of those on the ground" (Barnett 2005: 5). It should be clear that learning cannot and should not equal the search for a "one-size-fits-all template".

Therefore learning to learn is more than a question of technology. Ultimately, drawing and applying lessons is a craft. Finding the right balance between generalization and context-specificity is a constant challenge. To some extent, training programs can contribute to improving this craft.

Barnett also points to a broader problem, the kind of knowledge international bureaucracies privilege. In Barnett's words, "expertise derives from either professional training or general rules that encode past experiences. Those with this sort of expert knowledge generally see it as superior to local or informal knowledge" (Barnett 2005: 5). Therefore research needs to be mindful of the kinds of knowledge and the sources of knowledge that international bureaucracies use as a basis for decisions. The question proposed by Myint-U and Sellwood remains an essential one: "How did the UN 'know' what it believed it 'knew' about the countries in which it intervened, and how did this matter?" (Myint-U and Sellwood 1999: 1) Research needs to address the important questions associated with the generation and use of knowledge in international bureaucracies.

IV. OUTLOOK: EMBEDDING RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACIES

The proposed research agenda on international bureaucracies is not the first to postulate the "opening of the black box". In the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), it has a predecessor that offers an interesting case for comparison. FPA set out to take a closer look into the inner workings of the prevailing unit of analysis, the nation state (Hudson and Vore 1995). Indeed, the field has produced a significant body of innovative scholarship over the past decades, drawing on a wide range of disciplines, such as sociology, cognitive psychology and administrative science. However, as a recent study observed, FPA "has been a kind of free-floating enterprise, logically unconnected to the main theories of international relations" (Houghton 2007: 24).

Mindful of this experience, research on international bureaucracies should seek to actively engage with and connect to the dominant currents of IR research. This research agenda can only reach its full potential if it is able to embed itself into the discipline of IR. Research on international bureaucracies has very much to profit from the rigorous standards of scholarship in IR. In turn, IR is to gain from incorporating the interdisciplinary study of international bureaucracies into the heart of the discipline. On the one hand, the discipline will be more diverse intellectually and richer theoretically. Bringing in concepts from organization theory and public administration in particular will enrich the discipline which in recent decades has relied heavily on economics for the import of approaches and theories.[24] This applies to neorealism of the Waltzian sort, rational institutionalism of the Keohane variety and rational choice modelling approaches. On the other hand, IR will become more relevant if it produces meaningful findings on the work of international bureaucracies. The study of global governance in particular which has blossomed over the past decade especially in Europe will remain partially blind in its vision and scope if it does not concern itself more with the changing roles of international bureaucracies. Many of the approaches to be applied to the study of international bureaucracies can also be used for other organizations involved in global governance. For example, we have a remarkably superficial understanding of non-governmental organizations as organizations. The recent study by Hopgood (2006) on Amnesty International's international secretariat is a notable exception. Also, theories of inter-organizational relations can help to analyze the complex interactions of different organizations in various areas of global governance.

The study of international bureaucracies also has the potential to cross-fertilize with other recent applications of the governance paradigm to IR, including the study of European integration. Work on "governance in areas of limited statehood" (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2007) in particular will remain incomplete if it does not develop a sophisticated understanding of the role of international bureaucracies and other organizations active in "the field". For example, it is a worthwhile venture to compare the "learning capacity" of international bureaucracies, national bureaucracies and agencies as well as non-governmental organizations active in multidimensional peacebuilding (Campbell 2007). This would allow us to learn from the strength and weaknesses of each of the different organizations involved in complex ventures such as peacebuilding. Ultimately, comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different organizations involved in complex ventures of global governance might also allow us to determine (based on criteria of effectiveness and accountability) the best suited organizations or form of collaboration for different types of problems or tasks.

[24] This is not an interdisciplinary one-way street. Turning attention to international bureaucracies also has a distinct benefit to organization theory. As a recent introspection on the state of the field observes, the migration of organization researchers to business schools made organization theory "inattentive to human welfare and world affairs" (Walsh, Meyer and Schoonhoven 2006: 657). At the same time, "macro-organizational scholars since 1990 have largely abandoned the idea of cumulative work within a particular paradigm in favor of problem-driven work that is theoretically agnostic" and, in their view, "risks being simply business journalism with regressions" (Davis and Marquis 2005: 334-335). Bringing together approaches from IR and organization theory to study international bureaucracies can help make organization theory more relevant beyond the narrow confines of the business world and might also contribute to reverting to a conceptually ambitious and cumulative approach within organization theory.

As Olsen argues, the time has come to more generally "rediscover bureaucracy" in the context of governance research: "Bureaucratic, market and network organization are usually portrayed as alternatives, based respectively on hierarchical authority, competition and cooperation" (Olsen 2006: 23). From a "real world" perspective, it is the mix that matters – and this mix in global governance cannot be understood without the focus on the role of international bureaucracies and other organizations (ibid.).

The success of the research agenda also depends on effective strategies for data collection. The good news is that online publishing has greatly improved access to official documents. Still, the archives of international organizations in general and the UN in particular are notoriously sketchy and hard to access because many documents are classified. Large-scale quantitative data sets are only available for the work of the IMF and World Bank. For other organizations, such data sets remain elusive for the time being. In-depth interviews are one way to gain understanding of these organizations (both at headquarters and the field). The preferred option should be participatory observation by means of "embedded research" with the researcher spending extended periods of time in the organization. Here IR researchers stand to learn from the methods of social anthropologists. Michael Barnett's work on the UN and Rwanda very much profited from him spending a year working at the US mission to the UN during the genocide (Barnett 2002). While this raises important issues of funding, access and independence, the work on international bureaucracies critically depends on the immersion of the researchers with their objects of study.

International bureaucracies are deeply involved in all the crucial arenas of global governance and in the provision of global public goods (Kaul et al. 2003): from poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction and disarmament to climate change and the promotion of human rights. We should better know more on how they work, how they interact with other players, why they succeed or fail – and how we can get them to work more effective and accountable manner. Presently, IR contributes very little to this understanding. This is evident both in the lack of supply of conceptually ambitious and empirically rich studies and in the lack of demand from practitioners for the expertise of IR. When as a government or international organization leader you have problems with macroeconomic policy, you consult economists. When you want to know about the international law implications of your policies, you hire the leading international lawyers. When you have questions about the ethical implications of your policies, you have a fireside chat with the philosophical luminaries of the day. When you want to contextualize your actions in the *longue durée*, you call in your favourite historians.

So what did UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan do in the twilight of his second term when he was staring into the abyss as head of the most important international bureaucracy that was under fire for its lack of accountability and sound management? He called in Rajat Gupta, a senior partner and former global head of McKinsey & Company, as a special advisor on management reform. McKinsey brought in a team of consultants that worked with Annan's staff on a blueprint for a more effective and accountable UN Secretariat.[25] There were few reasons for the Secretary-General to turn to IR specialists. Had Annan cared to scan the IR community, it would have occurred to him that the discipline seemed to have neither the in-depth knowledge nor the tools nor the ambition to address the problems facing international bureaucracies such as the UN Secretariat. This would certainly be very much to the chagrin of the founders of the scientific study of IR. They would "reject the separation of theory from policy and its relative failure to address practical problems of the political world" (Bernstein et al. 2000: 44).[26] And they would very much regret the fact that IR as a discipline fails to study international bureaucracies as the core pillars of our cooperative efforts to create global order. For the better of IR and for the better of international bureaucracies and global governance this situation needs to change.

[25] Granted, Annan also consulted John Ruggie. But this exception rather proves the rule. Ruggie, a student of Ernst Haas, had long worked on and in international organizations. Although part of the IR community, Ruggie would have found little of use in IR research to address the UN Secretariat's malaise.

[26] See also Stephen Walt's (2005) discussion of the relationship between theory and policy in IR and the arguments advanced by Gunter Hellmann and Peter Rudolf (2007).

Annex:
The UN Peacebuilding Bureaucracy and its environment(s)



Sources: Public UN Documents (www.un.org; UN DPKO (2003), Handbook on Multidimensional Peace Operations); Interviews with UN officials, New York, 24-26 April 2006.

References

Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow (1999) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Reading, MA: Longman.

Ansell, Christopher K. and Steven Weber (1999) 'Organizing International Politics: Sovereignty and Open Systems' *International Political Science Review* 20:1, 73-93.

Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schön (1978) *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*. Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley.

Babuji, Hari and Mary Crossan (2004) 'From Questions to Answers: Reviewing Organizational Learning Research' *Management Learning* 35:4, 397-417.

Barnett, Michael (2002) *Eyewitness to a Genocide. The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

——— (2005) *Illiberal Peacebuilding and Liberal States*. Paper presented on 2005-02-08 at the Roundtable on Humanitarian Action, Social Science Research Council.

Barnett, Michael and Liv Coleman (2005) 'Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations' *International Studies Quarterly* 49:4, 593-620.

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (2005) 'Power in International Politics' *International Organization* 59:1, 39-75

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004) *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Bauer, Michael W. (2007) *Introduction: Management Reforms in International Organizations*. In Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill (eds.), *Management Reforms in International Organizations*. Verwaltungsressourcen und Verwaltungsstrukturen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 11-24.

Bauer, Michael W. and Christoph Knill (2007) *Theorizing Management Reforms in International Organizations*. In Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill (eds.), *Management Reforms in International Organizations*. Verwaltungsressourcen und Verwaltungsstrukturen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 191-200.

Bauer, Steffen (2006) 'Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority of Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats in Global Environmental Politics' *Global Environmental Politics* 6:1, 23-49.

Benner, Thorsten (forthcoming) 'Rethinking International Organizations and Accountability' *Europe's World*.

Benner, Thorsten, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann (2007) *Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework*. Forschung DSF. Osnabrück: German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF).

Benner, Thorsten, Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Jan-Martin Witte (2004) 'Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability' *Government and Opposition* 39:2, 191-210.

Benner, Thorsten and Philipp Rotmann (2008) 'Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2:1 (forthcoming).

Benner, Thorsten and Jan Martin Witte (2001) 'Brücken im globalen System. Neues Leitbild für internationale Organisationen' *Internationale Politik* 55:5, 1-8.

Bernstein, Steven, Richard Ned Lebow, Steven Weber and Janice Gross Stein (2000) 'God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World' *European Journal of International Relations* 6:3, 43-76.

Berthoin Antal, A., M. Dierkes, J. Child and I. Nonaka (2001) *Introduction: Finding Paths through the Handbook*. In Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child and Ikujiro Nonaka (eds.), *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Böhling, Kathrin (2005) *Boundary Spanning Activities, Organizing Processes, and Learning*. Paper presented on 2005-06-30 at the 21. EGOS Colloquium, Berlin.

——— (2007) *Opening up the Black Box. Organizational Learning in the European Commission*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse (2005) *Public-Private Partnerships. Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance?* In Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Complex Sovereignty. Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Breul, Rainer (2005) *Organizational Learning in International Organizations. The Case of UN Peace Operations*. M.A. thesis submitted to the Fachbereich Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft Konstanz: University of Konstanz (retrieved 2006-08-01 from http://www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/kops/volltexte/2005/1647/).

Brown, M. Leann, Michael Kenney and Michael J. Zarkin (eds.) (2006) *Organizational Learning in the Global Context*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Brunsson, Nils (2002) *The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions, Actions in Organizations*. Oslo: Abstrackt/Liber.

Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane (2006) 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions' *Ethics & International Affairs* 20:4, 405-437.

Campbell, Susanna P. (2007) *Organizational Learning: The Gateway to Peacebuilding Success?* Paper presented on 2007-02-28 at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL.

Chesterman, Simon (ed.) (2007) *Secretary or General?: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chesterman, Simon (2004) *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Michael D., James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1972/1988) *A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice*. In James G. March (ed.), *Decisions and Organizations*. London: Blackwell, 294-334.

Cohen, Michael D. and Lee S. Sproull (eds.) (1991) *Organizational Learning. Special Issue of Organization Science.* London: Sage Publications.

Cox, Robert W. (1969) 'The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization' *International Organization* 23:2, 205-230.

Crossan, Mary, Henry W. Lane and Roderick E. White (1999) 'An organizational learning framework: From Intuition to Institution' *Academy of Management Review* 24:3, 522-537.

Davis, Gerald F. and Christopher Marquis (2005) 'Prospects for Organization Theory in the Early Twenty-First Century: Institutional Fields and Mechanisms' *Organization Science* 16:14, 332-343.

Dicke, Klaus (1994) *Effizienz und Effektivität internationaler Organisationen. Darstellung und kritische Analyse eines Topos im Reformprozeß der Vereinten Nationen* Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Dierkes, Meinolf, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child and Ikujiro Nonaka (2001) *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dingwerth, Klaus and Sabine Campe (2006) 'Organizing the World: Ein Tagungsbericht' *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 13:1, 119-131.

Dingwerth, Klaus and Philipp Pattberg (2007) 'World Politics and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational Environmental Rule-Making' *Offene Tagung der Sektion Internationale Politik der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft* Darmstadt 13.-14. Juli 2007.

Dodgson, Mark (1993) 'Organizational Learning: A Review of Some Literatures' *Organization Studies* 14:3, 375-394.

Easterby-Smith, Mark (ed.) (2005) *The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management*. Ocford: Blackwell.

Etheredge, Lloyd S (1981) *Government learning: An overview*. In Samuel L Long (ed.), *The Handbook of Political Behavior*. New York/London: Plenum, 73-161.

Fosdick, Raymond B. (1946) 'Review of: The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration' *The American Historical Review* 51:4, 691-693.

Gould, David J. and Herbert C. Kelman (1970) 'Horizons of Research on the International Civil Service' *Public Administration Review* 30:3, 244-251.

Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane (2005) 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. ' *American Political Science Review* 99:1, 29-44.

Haas, Ernst (1990) *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Haas, Peter and Ernst Haas (1995) 'Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance' *Global Governance* 1:3, 255-284.

Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman (1989) *Organizational Ecology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hawkins, Darren and Wade Jacoby (2006) *How Agents Matter*. In Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson and Michael J. Tierney (eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (retrieved 2006-05-05 from http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/Delegation%20volume.htm).

Hazzard, Shirley (1973) *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations*. London: Macmillan.

Hellmann, Gunther and Peter Rudolf (2007) 'Über die Produktion von Wissen. Forschung und Beratung in den internationalen Beziehungen und in der Außenpolitik' *Internationale Politik* 62:5, 110-121.

Hellmann, Gunther, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (2003) *Die Neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Hopgood, Stephen (2006) *Keepers of the Flame. Understanding Amnesty International*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Houghton, David Patrick (2007) 'Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3:1, 24–45.

Howard, Lise Morjé (forthcoming 2008) *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huber, George P. (1991) 'Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures' *Organization Science* 2:1, 88-115.

Hudson, Valerie M. and Christopher S. Vore (1995) 'Reflection, Evaluation, Integration. Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow' *Mershon International Studies Review* 39:2, 209-238.

Kaul, Inge, Pedro Conceiçao, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza (eds.) (2003) *Providing Global Public Goods. Managing Globalization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. (2006) 'Accountability in World Politics' *Scandinavian Political Studies* 29:2, 75-87.

Kille, Kent J. (2006) *Reconsidering the Power of the UN Secretary-General: Religious Leadership and Moral Authority in International Affairs*. Paper presented on 2006-08-31 at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.

Kim, Daniel H. (1993) 'The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning' *MIT Sloan Management Review* 35:1, 37-50.

Klimecki, Rüdiger, Hermann Laßleben and M. Thomae (1999) *Organisationales Lernen. Ein Ansatz zur Intergration von Theorie, Empirie und Gestaltung*. Discussion Paper.

Koppell, Jonathan GS (2005) 'Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of 'Multiple Accountabilities Disorder'' *Public Administration Review* 65:1, 94-108.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (2001) 'The Rational Design of International Institutions' *International Organization* 55:4, 761-799.

Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie (1986) 'International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state' *International Organization* 40:4, 753-775.

LaPalombara, Joseph (2001) *Power and Politics in Organizations: Public and Private Sector Comparisons*. In M. Dierkes, A. Berthoin Antal, J. Child and I. Nonaka (eds.), *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Liese, Andrea and Silke Weinlich (2006) *Die Rolle von Verwaltungsstäben internationaler Organisationen. Lücken, Tücken und Konturen eines (neuen) Forschungsgebiets*. In Jörg Bogumil, Werner Jann and Frank Nullmeier (eds.), *Politik und Verwaltung. PVS-Sonderheft 37*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 491-525.

Lipson, Michael (2004) *A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping*. Paper presented on June 3-5, 2004 at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

——— (2007) ‘Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?’ *European Journal of International Relations* 13:1, 5-34.
Lukes, Steven (1974) *Power: A Radical View*. London: Macmillan.
Mallaby, Sebastian (2004) *The World's Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations* New York: Penguin Press.
March, James (2006) ‘Ideas as Art. Interviewed by Diane Coutu’ *Harvard Business Review* October 2006, 83-89.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1976) *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
March, James G. and Herbert Simon (1958) *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.
Martin, Lisa and Beth Simmons (2002) *International Organizations and Institutions*. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage Publications, 192-211.
Mathiason, John R. (2007) *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats and World Politics*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
Meyer, John W. and W. Richard Scott (1992) *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality*. London, New Delhi: Sage.
Murphy, Craig M. (2006) *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?* New York: Cambridge University Press.
Myint-U, Thant and Amy Scott (2007) *The UN Secretariat: A Brief History*. New York: International Peace Academy.
Myint-U, Thant and Elizabeth Sellwood (1999) *Knowledge and Humanitarian Intervention: The UN's experiences in Bosnia and Cambodia*. Centre for History and Economics, King's College London.
Nagl, John A. (2005) *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Nielson, Daniel, Michael J. Tierney and Catherine E. Weaver (2006) ‘Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank’ *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9:2, 107-139.
Nonaka, Ikujiro (1994) ‘A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation’ *Organization Science* 15:1, 14-37.
Olsen, Johan P. (2006) ‘Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy’ *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16:1, 1-24.
Rid, Thomas (2007) *War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq*. Cass Military Studies. London: Routledge.
Risse, Thomas and Ursula Lehmkuhl (2007) ‘Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit’ *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 20-21, 3-9.
Rittberger, Volker and Bernhard Zangl (1994) *Internationale Organisationen - Politik und Geschichte*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.
Rochester, Martin J. (1986) ‘The Rise and Fall of International Organizations as a Field of Study’ *International Organization* 40:4, 777–813.
Sanjuan, Pedro A. (2005) *The UN Gang: A Memoir of Incompetence, Corruption, Espionage, Anti-Semitism and Islamic Extremism at the UN Secretariat*. New York: Doubleday Books
Scott, W. Richard and John W. Meyer (1994) *Institutional Environments and Organizations. Structural Complexity and Individualism*. London, New Delhi: Sage.
Seibel, Wolfgang (1996) ‘Successful Failure. An Alternative View on Organizational Coping’ *American Behavorial Scientist* 39:8, 1011-1024.
——— (2003) ‘Suchen wir immer an der richtigen Stelle? Einige Bemerkungen zur politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges’ *Politische Viertelsjahresschrift* 44:2, 217-228.
——— (2005) *'Administrative Science Meets Peacekeeping.' Verwaltungswissenschaftliche Theoriebildung und die Implementierung von Friedensmissionen*. University of Konstanz.
Seibel, Wolfgang, Julian Junk, Till Blume and Elisabeth Schöndorf (2007) *Public Administration meets Peacebuilding. Coordination, Learning, and Leadership as Challenges to Peace Operations: the Cases of Sudan and Liberia*. Paper presented on 2007-06-15..17 at the Public

Administration Meets Peacebuilding - Peace Operations as Political and Managerial Challenges, University of Konstanz.
Senghaas-Knobloch, Eva, Jan Dirks and Andrea Liese (2003) *Internationale Arbeitsregulierung in Zeiten der Globalisierung. Politisch-organisatorisches Lernen in der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (IAO)*. Münster: Lit.
Shawn, Eric (2006) *The UN Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America's Security and Fails the World* New York: Sentinel HC
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2004) *A New World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sprinz, Detlef (2003) *Internationale Regime und Institutionen*. In Gunther Hellmann, Klaus-Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (eds.), *Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 251-273.
Thompson, James D. (1967) *Boundary Spanning in Different Types of Organizations*. In James D. Thompson (ed.), *Organizations in Action. Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 66-73.
Tierney, Michael and Catherine E. Weaver (eds.) (Forthcoming) *The Politics of International Organizations: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide*: Cornell University Press.
Traub, James (2006) *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Ulbert, Cornelia (2003) *Sozialkonstruktivismus*. In Manuela Schindler and Siegfried Schiedler (eds.), *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen*. Opladen: UTB.
Urquhart, Brian (1987) *A Life in Peace and War*. New York: Harper & Row.
Verbeek, Bertjaan (1998) *International Organizations: The Ugly Duckling of International Relations Theory?* In Bob Reinalda and Bertjaan Verbeek (eds.), *Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations*. London: Routledge, 11–26.
Walsh, James P., Alan D. Meyer and Claudia Bird Schoonhoven (2006) 'A Future for Organization Theory: Living in and Living with Changing Organizations' *Organization Science* 17, 657-671.
Walt, Stephen (2005) 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations' *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, 23-48.
Weaver, Catherine and Ralf J. Leiteritz (2005) '"Our Poverty Is a World Full of Dreams:" Reforming the World Bank.' *Global Governance* 11:3, 369-388.
Weber, Max (1980 (1921)) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*. Tübingen: Mohr.
Wedgwood, Ruth (2005a) *Give the United Nations a Little Competition*. New York Times, 2005-12-05.
——— (2005b) 'A Run for the Money: Spin-Offs, Rivals and UN Reform' *The National Interest* 82, 76-81.
Weiss, Thomas George (1975) *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats.* Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books.
Wendt, Alexander (1987) 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory' *International Organization* 41:3, 335-370.
——— (2001) 'Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design' *International Organization* 55:4, 1019-1049.
Witte, Jan Martin and Wolfgang H. Reinicke (2005) *Business UNusual. Facilitating United Nations Reform Through Partnerships.* New York: United Nations Publications.
Zürn, Michael (1998) *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats: Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.