


**P. Stolzenberg**

**Kassel Case study report**



**Contents**

1. Introduction .....	2
2. Socioeconomic features of the City of Kassel .....	2
3. Municipality of Kassel: Political leadership and the fiscal problem.....	3
4. Problem Perceptions and Causes .....	7
5. Scope and means of Actions: Evaluation, Performance, Impact .....	9
6. Public debate .....	10
7. Political system: Legitimacy and Transparency, political culture, Policy style, knowledge, leadership .....	11
8. Conclusions .....	12
9. Policy recommendations .....	12
Recommendations for Local Level Actors (Micro-level) .....	13
Recommendations for Federal and Federal State Level Actors (Macro-level).....	13
References .....	14

## 1. Introduction

The case report gives a brief and provisional summary on our empirical findings on fiscal policy in Kassel. The first two chapters are descriptions of the socio-economic situation, the political actor constellation and the fiscal challenges based on statistical data and existing literature. The chapters four and five review our own empirical findings on the perception of local actors on fiscal problems and their explanation as well their view on the local scope of action and the concrete consolidation means including the assumed impacts. These chapters are purely descriptive and we illustrated them with several quotations and data derived from our MAXQDA-analysis. In the following chapters the analyses and interpretation of researchers became relevant. We will discuss the policy and leadership styles, the different kinds of legitimacy, the local political culture and knowledge types influencing the fiscal policy making. The empirical corpus of the case Kassel includes up to now (22<sup>th</sup> September):

- interviews with: deputy mayor of economics, head of the financial department, two councillors (one from the majority and one from the opposition), interviews are not transcribed and not part of the MAXQDA-analysis up to now, an interest group and the supervision
- 241 texts of local press, party manifestos, coalition treaties etc.

## 2. Socioeconomic features of the City of Kassel

The city of Kassel (197.571 inhabitants, slightly decreasing, Bertelsmann Stiftung) is the biggest city of the region of northern Hesse which is one of the structural weakest areas of Hesse. The city which was situated in the inner German border area (“Zonenrandgebiet”) supported by economic development means of the federal state is nowadays located in the geographical centre of the reunified Germany. This favourable situation is reinforced by a good traffic infrastructure (new railway station since 1991, regional airport since 2013, freeways in all directions). Although important production plants of automotive and defence industries are still located in the region Kassel suffered from severe economic restructuring. The specific challenge for Kassel and the region was that major companies had only their core production units there whereas headquarters and research and development units were located somewhere else.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the internationalization of production hit the city hard and economic decisions affecting this “remote-controlled industrial region” were largely taken without considering local socio-economic and political conditions (Dittmar 2004, pp. 183–195). After years of dissatisfactory development strategies signs of a new economic success emerge. In cooperation with the university an economic cluster of technology-based small and medium-sized companies was established and the renewable energy company “SMA Solar Technology” is a highly visible showcase for the economic success of the city. Furthermore, in 2011 the Cologne Institute for Economic Research awarded Kassel as “Germany’s most dynamic city” because the city successfully reduced unemployment, youth unemployment

---

<sup>1</sup> The biggest industrial employers with plants or subsidiary companies in the region: Volkswagen (in the neighboring municipality of Baunatal, Wolfsburg), Daimler-Benz (Stuttgart), Bombardier (Montreal), Krauss-Maffei-Wegmann (München), Rheinmetall (Düsseldorf) and BASF (Ludwigshafen)

and the rate of social welfare recipients while the disposable income, economic growth and the share of highly qualified employees rose. Moreover, the ranking assigned good marks to the educational infrastructure as well as to the city's services in health care and culture (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft 2011) - Kassel is the location of Germany's most important exhibition of modern arts, the "documenta". Nevertheless, the key socio-economic data show that there is still a considerably economic lag compared to the average of Hesse, especially the south with the Frankfurt-Rhein/Main area, and Germany (see Table 1). Another challenge is that the city's budget is only partly benefiting from the economic recovery as many plants are situated in the surrounding municipalities, e.g. the headquarters of SMA and the production plant of Volkswagen. The city and the county of Kassel promoted a regional reform following the example of the regions of Hanover and Aachen which possibly could solve this problem (Bischoff *et al.* 2014). However, this reform is suspended instantly due to legal concerns of the federal state and is no longer being discussed. Moreover, the local government revisited their opinion on the regional reform because the city is economically too strong by now to benefit from amalgamations in their view.

Table 1: socio-economic data of Kassel

		<b>Kassel</b>	<b>Hesse</b>	<b>Germany</b>
unemployment rate	in %	9.7	5.6	6.5
social welfare rate	in %	7.4	3.7	4.5
disposable household income	in € per capita	17.038	20.452	19.933
primary household income	in € per capita	18740	24938	
employees in industrial sector	in %	13.6	17.7	20.4
employees in service sector	in %	82.9	77.2	73.4


Sources: unemployment rate and social welfare rate (12/2013): Bundesagentur für Arbeit; disposable household income (2011): Statistische Ämter der Länder 2012, employees in economic sectors (2012): Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2012.

### **3. Municipality of Kassel: Political leadership and the fiscal problem**

The city of Kassel is governed by a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. Kassel was the first municipality with a cooperation of those parties in 1981 but the city experienced also one of the first coalitions between the Green Party and the Christian Democratic Party which was followed by today's coalition in 2006. After the last elections in 2011 Social Democrats and Greens decided to proceed with the existing coalition although there were some sources of conflicts between both parties, e.g. the development of an industrial area ("Langes Feld") and the reconstruction of an industrial monument ("Salzmann Areal"). The mayor of Kassel, a Social Democrat, won the election against the incumbent in 2005 and was re-elected in the first ballot in 2011. He is an experienced administrative leader as he was amongst others president of the administrative district (Regierungsbezirk) of Kassel, the deconcentrated federal state administration and the supervision for local governments, and CEO of the data processing centre for municipal administration in the region. The same applies to the deputy mayor for economics, a graduated economist and also a Social Democrat,

who is in office since 1991 and worked for the Deutsche Bank AG and as an economic policy advisor for the Social Democratic Party before. The deputy mayor for economics is also responsible for the social policies and therefore directly in charge of the biggest partial budget. He will retire in 2015 and the discussions about his succession already started. In contrast to our other cases in Hesse a collegiate governing body (“Magistrat”) is responsible for the executive functions and the mayor is a “collegiate leader” (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006) and primus inter pares in this governing body.<sup>2</sup> Besides this institutional specificity we can conclude that Kassel has an actor constellation which is similar to Wuppertal – with less political fragmentation in comparison to Magdeburg and Mainz -, as in both cases clear majorities with formal coalitions and high personnel continuity can be observed. Moreover, in both cases mayor and deputy mayor for economics have the same party affiliation and the leadership has far-reaching political and administrative experience.

Figure 1: seating in the council of Kassel after the local government elections in 2011




Below the fiscal situation of the municipality before the implementation of the bailout fund in 2012 will be described. We will compare the fiscal data of Kassel with our other cases and with other comparable independent cities of the federal state Hesse (Darmstadt, Offenbach and Wiesbaden, except Frankfurt Main). The first observation is that the fiscal challenges of Kassel are lower than in Wuppertal or Mainz. The city had primary surpluses with the exception of 2010 when the crisis hit the municipal budget. Furthermore, in 2013 the city had also a balanced budget in the accounting system used in Hesse (Figure 2). The amount of total and short-term debt per capita is lower than in Mainz, Wuppertal and the average of the independent cities in Hesse (Figure 3). The collection rates for business tax are similar to the Hessian average and close to the rates of the other cases. In contrast to that the real property tax is higher than in the other independent cities in Hesse but the rate is exceeded by Wuppertal and Magdeburg (Figure 4). Moreover, the statistics of the revenue-side show that total revenues (with the exception of Wuppertal), tax revenues and business tax revenues exceed the other cases and other independent cities. The only exception is the income tax revenues which are lower than the Hessian average. This seems to reflect the low household income (see chapter 2) but due to the adjusted allocation formula for the income tax the

<sup>2</sup> The mayor and other full-time and honorary members are part of the collegial body which decides with majority on all executive tasks. The vote of the mayor decides in a voting tie.


impact on the municipal budget is small (Figure 5). The social challenges we have described affect the budget but the social spending is almost in the average of the Hessian cities and together with Mainz in the middle of our cases. In contrast to that the spending for staff seems to be comparably high as Kassel exceeds our other cases and the Hessian average (Figure 6). The investment spending is higher than in our other cases but the same applies to the other Hessian cities.

Figure 2: primary deficit/surplus and ordinary result in Euro per capita




Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013

Figure 3: total and short-term debt of local government in comparison in Euro per capita in 2012




Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013

Figure 4: collection rates of local government taxes in comparison in 2012




Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013

Figure 5: revenues of local government in comparison in Euro per capita in 2012



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013

Figure 6: spending of local government in Wuppertal in comparison in Euro per capita in 2012



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013

## 4. Problem Perceptions and Causes

Table 2 shows the exact codings of reasons of the fiscal problems with different sub-codes.

Table 2

endogenous causes				18
	Jugendhilfe			3
	Brückengeländer			1
	Hessentag			2
	Abwrackprämie für Kühlschränke			2
	Konrad			9
	Theatersanierung			1
	Personalpolitik			3
	Städtische Klinik			2
	Flughafen			6
	Grimm-Welt			1
exogenous causes				0
	upper level government			9
		European level		0
		National/federal level		0
			Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz	3
			U-3 Betreuung	1
		federal state level		3
			Sonderprogramm der Hessischen Landesregierung zur Behebung von	0
			Finanzausgleich	4
	socio economic conditions			1
		Niedriglöhne		2
		Einkommenssteuer		3
		unemployment		0
		financial crisis		2

The following quotes matrices (Table 3) displays some trenchant statements of different actor groups on the endogenous causes of the fiscal crisis. Local actors discuss the necessity of a number of projects, e.g. a bicycle renting system, the municipal funding for the airport, scrapping premiums for fridges or the planned museum about the Grimm brothers'. In contrast to that the actors do not label concrete reasons in our interviews and general statements on problematic former spending behaviors were common.

Table 3: different types of endogenous and exogenous reasons

actor	Segment	document group
Interview 1	I don't think that there are distinct challenges in Kassel which we have to manage by applying fiscal measures. Furthermore, I do not assume that we have a backlog of work as – due to the division of East and West Germany – Kassel had always chosen the smaller version and had always kept an eye on limiting expenditures.	interviews

	Consequently, I don't believe that we have a backlog of rationalization measures according to human resources of our civil services but instead, we have a general problem which can be seen in everywhere in Germany.	
CDU	The ongoing efforts of the mayor to shift the blame of the city's dreadful financial situation onto the state is not in a balanced and objective manner. The mayor was not able to implement an effective consolidation program. Instead, he wastes money.	press article
journalist	Despite many efforts, the town's political leaders did not yet go all out to change the course of consolidation. The chief administrator of the supervision is convinced of the importance of taking unpopular measures in order to improve.	Press article
Interview 3	It could also be related to the expenditure policy of the last years and decades. [...] I do believe that the municipality might be also responsible for the current situation.	interviews
interview 2	I would not manly look at the responsibility of politicians of Kassel for the current debt, but instead look at those politicians on federal and state level who allocated additional tasks to municipalities without distributing additional financial resources for their funding.	interviews

Table 4 shows some quotations on the exogenous causes including the different sub-codes of fiscal problems. Like in Mainz the local actors criticize the federal state for cutbacks in the equalization scheme which causes a reduction of state grants before the bailout program was introduced.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, some socio-economic conditions (low number of taxpayers – students, unemployed, and many in-commuters) were named that cause comparatively low revenues from income tax and high expenditures for social welfare. The explanations for the reasons of debt differ between the council fractions. Hence, the administration and the majority blames the federal and the federal state level for fiscal problems and the opposition criticizes that the local government does not recognize own faults.

*Table 4: exogenous causes of the fiscal crisis – selected quotations*

actor	Segment	document group
Interview 1	The level of debt of Kassel is a delayed effect of the former division of Germany, the Second World War as well as the structural change and therefore, can be compared with cities in North Rhine Westphalia [...] high unemployment rates [...] high social cost and high youth welfare costs have emerged [...].	interviews
Interest group	The municipalities are underfunded in relation to their tasks. Both federal and federal state level actors are mainly responsible for the dreadful financial situation.	Press article
Mayor and deputy mayor for economics	The mayor and the treasurer wrote in one of their press releases that they will “take all necessary steps in order to fulfil the requirements”. However, possibilities for further consolidation means are limited. Increasing financial deficits of the city are also perceived to be a result of decreasing fiscal grants of the state. At the same time, federal and federal state level assign more and more duties to municipalities such as the ambitious goal of childcare for children less than three years of age.	Press article
Greens	More and more duties are assigned to municipalities by federal and federal state level. There are no remaining possibilities for fiscal savings within the municipal	Press article

<sup>3</sup> In 2011 the federal state government reduced the state grants for the fiscal equalization scheme (340 to 400 Million Euro per year). The constitutional court of Hesse (“Staatsgerichtshof”) decided in 2013 in a lawsuit initiated by a small municipality that these cutbacks were unlawful because the federal state government has not calculate the financial needs of the local level before adjusting the amount of grants. Therefore, the federal state government has to revisit the equalization scheme until 2016.




## 5. Scope and means of Actions: Evaluation, Performance, Impact

Like in our other cases the local government and most of the council fractions welcomed the bailout program. Only the Left Party refuses to support the program because it affects local democracy and transfers neoliberal policies to the local level. Although participation in the program gained broad support in the council concrete means were contested. Especially the close-down of district libraries led to major conflicts in the council and in the wider public debate.

In comparison to our other cases the amount of all consolidation means is much lower (109 Euro, 1.201 Euro per capita in Mainz and 1.126 Euro per capita in Wuppertal). The local government strictly follows the strategy to keep tax rates stable and therefore has not raised the tax rates for many years. The increase of revenues based only on raising parking fees, taxes for gambling machines and fees for services, which can only slightly contribute to fiscal consolidation.

Figure 7: implemented consolidation means, in Euro per capita 2012-2021



Source: (Stadt Wuppertal)

The bailout program and the local implementation have probably no long-term impact on fiscal policies and other policy fields **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.** The supervision and the administrative leadership emphasize that no profound consolidation means were implemented in Kassel. Therefore, the bailout program seems to be a windfall profit for the administration which reduces local government debt and the expenditures for interests without an equivalent reward. Consolidation means in smaller municipalities where much stricter according to the supervision. As the biggest city in the bailout program which receives the highest amount of funding and is well connected to other municipalities Kassel could easily let the whole program fail. Nevertheless, only a few actors in the city, namely the administrative leadership, could dispose about this power as they are the interfaces in the multilevel-system.

## 6. Public debate

Although the fiscal amount of consolidation was comparatively low in Kassel the public debate was visible and conflictual. Especially one consolidation mean, the close-down of district libraries, got a major topic on political agenda. Actually the district libraries got subject of the first local referendum in Kassel. The majority of votes were against the close-down but the initiative clearly failed to reach the quorum of 25 per cent of the eligible voters voting in favour of the initiative. Like in Wuppertal the civil society was able to raise their voice in the public debate. Another example is the initially planned close-down of two open air pools which was not a mean in the consolidation treaty but amongst others justified by the obligations from the participation in the bailout program. Although these groups clearly advocated particular interest of the affected districts they also strengthened the discussion on fiscal priorities by questioning other projects of the local government (e.g. the airport or the new museum). Furthermore, a local branch of the initiative “umFAIRteilen – Reichtum besteuern”/lit. “Redistribution – Tax Wealth!”, which was supported by trade unions and social welfare organizations took up these topics. This initiative organized a demonstration in front of the town hall when the council decided on the participation in the bailout program. They condemned the increase of fees and the cutbacks in municipal services. Instead of that they called for an increase of the business tax. Despite these interesting features of the local debate the MAXQDA-Analysis of actors in the press (Table 5) shows similar results like in the other cases. The most active actor in the local debate is again the deputy mayor for economics but the mayor also raises his voice comparatively often. The other most cited actors are heads of council fractions. An exception is one actor from the “General Federation of Trade Unions”/”Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund” who was a driving force of the mentioned initiative.

Table 5: actors with most press articles quoting or paraphrasing their statements

code	codings	codings %	documents	actor group	position	opposition/majority	party
Jürgen Barthel	67	9,12	53	local politicians	deputy mayor of economics	majority	SPD
Bertram Hilgen	35	4,76	25	local politicians	mayor	majority	
Norbert Wett	25	3,40	24	local politicians	councillor	opposition	CDU
letter to the editor	22	2,99	18	others			
Gernot Rönz	14	1,90	12	local politicians	councillor	majority	Grüne
Christian Geselle	14	1,90	13	local politicians	councillor	majority	SPD
Michael Rudolph	11	1,50	6	interest group	business chamber/association		
Kai Boeddinghaus	10	1,36	7	local politicians	councillor	opposition	Linke
Frank Oberbrunner	8	1,09	8	local politicians	councillor	opposition	FDP
Christof Nolda	4	0,54	3	local politicians	deputy mayor	majority	Grüne

## 7. Political system: Legitimacy and Transparency, political culture, Policy style, knowledge, leadership

The policy style is strictly top-down and the administrative leadership, mainly be the mayor and the deputy mayor of economics, control fiscal policies. In contrast to Mainz and Wuppertal the council including the majority fractions of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party seem to have no chance to participate in the first phases of decision-making. The administration only includes the council when there is a legal need to do so. Probably, this policy style also caused some of the disagreements within the coalition (e.g. on the question of the open air pools) and increased conflicts on some of cutbacks (especially on the libraries). Moreover, the political culture seems to be contradictive. Indeed, the participation in the bailout program was a consensual decision of the council (except the Left Party) but the implementation shows a contradictive political culture. The opposition voted against the concrete means, accused the opposition to waste money and deplored the described policy style. Moreover, the administration refused all proposals of the opposition.

The administrative leadership seems to have a clear strategy. The local government forecloses tax increases, especially business tax, as a possibility to consolidate the budget because economic growth is the absolute priority for the local government. In this view the city can only solve their fiscal challenges by attracting industrial settlements and high income classes. Therefore, the leadership is strategic but also clearly authoritarian, as the mayor and the deputy mayor for economics fiscal policies dominate by using their full institutional and political power.

The dominant role of the municipal leadership emphasizes that institutional and steering knowledge are again the most important knowledge types. On the one hand side this is convincing as the administration was the only actor knowing which conditions have to be fulfilled and which means were possible to be implemented in the bailout program. On the other hand the local government has not activated local knowledge as a source of citizen engagement or decentralized self-organizing. Therefore, conflicts on cutbacks arise that are probably not reasonable related to the fiscal amount of the consolidation mean.

Table 6

actor	Segment	document group
Interview 3	Quite a lot was already negotiated within the governing body itself – mainly with the treasurer. [...] Those were indeed guidelines. The possibilities were limited, too. Well of course, you could have said: We offer an alternative. But it is not so easy with the alternatives because there are not many services which can be deleted.	interviews
Interview 2	First of all, the municipal administration called off discussions – even in the council. Instead, suggestions were worked out and then presented to the council meeting. [...]	interviews
CDU	Consolidation measures suggested by the CDU have always been rejected by the majority. The governing body has to say now which cutback it will implement to meet the requirements of the consolidation program. This discussion should not take part behind the close doors of the coalition	Press article

## **8. Conclusions**

In contrast to Mainz and Wuppertal it was difficult to identify clear cases of mismanagement. As the actors of the administrative leadership are in office for a long time they could not refer to burdens caused by former governments like in Mainz. Indeed, the opposition is also not able to label concrete endogenous causes for local government debt although they criticize the fiscal priorities of the local government.

The contribution of the bailout program to the fiscal consolidation in Kassel seems to be comparatively small. The city benefited from the windfall profits of state funding but own attempts to consolidate the budget within the scheme of the bailout program are much smaller than in Mainz or Wuppertal. Nevertheless, the strict top down policy and the authoritarian leadership caused major conflicts in local politics. The local government strategy which excluded increases of real property and business tax which have been soundless implemented in Mainz and Wuppertal and made up the biggest share in their consolidation plans. If the strategy to consolidate the budget by initiating economic growth will work in the future is doubtful. Strategic leadership and planning euphoria seem to close to each other because the reliance on growth is risky and probably overestimates the steering capacities of the local government. Indeed, Kassel had a remarkable economic development in the recent years but the dynamic of growth could slow down because the gains from the unification are unlasting, the room for industrial settlements is nearly exhausted and it is difficult to integrate the remaining unemployed in the job market. Moreover, despite a notable increase of the business tax revenues in the last decade, it was not possible to consolidate the budget up to now. Moreover, there a number of open questions which will influence the success of fiscal policies in the next years. One of most important points is the outstanding reform of the fiscal equalization scheme for local governments in Hesse. If the expectation of the local governments will be fulfilled that the federal state withdrawals earlier cutbacks of state grants the chances for success will be much higher.

A remarkable observation is that we have a vivid public debate on fiscal priorities which contains interest groups arguing in favour of the preservation of municipal services or alternative consolidation means. Indeed, we have to consider that the public debate is not connected to the decision-making process. Agenda-setting and decision-making is exclusively controlled by the administrative leadership. The council had no influence on the consolidation program except the formal affirmation of the means. Moreover, although the participation in the bailout fund is not contested concrete means were accomplished by the majority – we found this pattern also in Mainz and Wuppertal.

## **9. Policy recommendations**

## **Recommendations for Local Level Actors (Micro-level)**

Political culture: Mayors and treasurers should represent the whole coalition government otherwise it is more difficult to mobilize enough political support for consolidation policies.

Output-legitimacy: The exclusion of revenue-based consolidation means is demanding for local governments as the possibilities for efficiency means and cutbacks are restricted after several years of consolidation.

Attempts of regional cooperation need the acceptance of all affected municipalities from the beginning.

Economic growth is a favourable condition for consolidation but economic policy alone is not a sufficient strategy.

Municipal owned companies should be restricted to their tasks in local public services which do not overburden local steering capacities and the knowledge of local actors.

Input-legitimacy: Trying to prevent discourses on consolidation means is a dangerous strategy. Direct democratic elements have to be considered as new veto-points especially for consolidation means with clear definable affected groups.

Policy style/  
Leadership:

## **Recommendations for Federal and Federal State Level Actors (Macro-level)**

Consolidation programs need objectives for local consolidations plans that prevent bargained solutions behind closed doors which favour bigger cities with higher political power and political networks in comparison to smaller municipalities.

Consolidation programs are able to strengthen the position of fiscal policy makers in local bargaining processes but also their argumentation as they can refer to direct and short-term benefits of consolidation (triadic communication).

Cooperative legislation (consultation with local government associations) and implementation of bailout programs could lead to brought acceptance of the program on the one hand side but make stricter sanctions and mixed funds (financial contributions of the local level to the program) impossible.

## References

- Bertelsmann Stiftung. *Wegweiser Kommune: Bevölkerungsprognose - Kassel - Gesamtbevölkerungsentwicklung 2009 bis 2030* [online]. Available from: <https://www.wegweiser-kommune.de/statistik/bevoelkerungsprognose+kassel+gesamtbevoelkerungsentwicklung+2009-2030+tabelle> [Accessed 22 Jul 2014].
- Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013. *Wegweiser Kommune: Finanzberichte*. Gütersloh.
- Bischoff, I., et al., 2014. *Wirkungen der Regionalreform: Was denken die Bürgerinnen und Bürger?: Ergebnisse einer Befragung im Sommer 2013*. Gutachten im Auftrag der IHK Kassel-Marburg. Kassel: Universität Kassel.
- Bundesagentur für Arbeit. *Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik nach Regionen* [online]. Available from: [https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Statistik-nach-Regionen/Politische-Gebietsstruktur-Nav.html?year\\_month=201406](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Statistik-nach-Regionen/Politische-Gebietsstruktur-Nav.html?year_month=201406) [Accessed 22 Jul 2014].
- Dittmar, S., 2004. *Strukturwandel in rüstungsindustriell geprägten Regionen: Regionalentwicklung und Konversion in den 1990er Jahren in den Regionen Augsburg, Ulm, Friedrichshafen und Kassel*. Dissertation. Universität Dortmund.
- Heinelt, H. and Hlepas, N.K., 2006. Typologies of Local Government Systems. In: H. Bäck, H. Heinelt, and A. Magnier, eds. *The European mayor*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 21–42.
- Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2011. *Städteranking 2011: Die 50 größten deutschen Städte im Test*. Bericht der IW Consult GmbH im Auftrag der Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Köln.
- Stadt Wuppertal. *Haushaltsanierungsplan 2012-2021*.
- Statistische Ämter der Länder, 2012. *Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder: Einkommen der privaten Haushalte in den kreisfreien Städten und Landkreisen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2000 bis 2011*, Reihe 2, Kreisergebnisse Band 3. Available from: [https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/VGRderLaender/VGR\\_KreisergebnisseBand3.html](https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/VGRderLaender/VGR_KreisergebnisseBand3.html).
- Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2012. *Erwerbstätigenrechnung: Erwerbstätige in den kreisfreien Städten und Landkreisen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991 bis 2012*. Available from: [http://www.statistikportal.de/statistikportal/ETR\\_R2B1\\_2012\\_j.pdf](http://www.statistikportal.de/statistikportal/ETR_R2B1_2012_j.pdf).