Patterns of Constitutional Reform in Federal Structures
The research project addressed cases of fundamental reforms of the territorial structure of federal states or regionalization in unitary states. Such reforms aim at revising ineffective centralization, improving the management of interdependence or solving conflicts in a multinational state. Irrespective of their goals, they are associated with a redistribution of power between governments and parliaments at the different levels, which makes them particularly difficult.
It is often assumed that these complications of a reform can be explained by rules of constitutional amendment. However, comparative studies have not confirmed this assumption. Our research therefore focused at structures and procedures of constitutional politics and policy-making. We found that the more complex the negotiating structures, the more effective constitutional reforms. Not constitutional conventions, that are often recommended in public discussions, nor constitutional committees usually established in the legislature or the executive, turn out as promising structures for drafting a reform. Effective reforms are more likely to result from negotiations including political leaders, administrative experts and representatives from civil society in separate “arenas” that are interconnected in a sequential process. These structures provide opportunities to generate both innovative reform proposals and to balance interests. They prevent the domination of interests of governments and parties in maintaining their power and to constrain reforms by veto players.
Moreover, our comparative research revealed that federal constitutional reforms generally do not fail, as predicted by existing theories. Rather, they often end with formal constitutional amendments. More often than not, ineffective reform proposals are ratified that resulted from bargaining in committees or meetings of party leaders. In mononational states, such outcomes consolidate the status quo, in multinational federations they can lead to further destabilization. Such consequences can be avoided by appropriate negotiation structures and procedures.
